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RECORD CITATION" SY:JIBOLS 
On the verso side of his table of contents page, the 
Appellant has indicated the SYJ-nbols he used in citing 
the various parts of the record on appeal. The Respond-
ent "\v"i.ll conform to the same citation system in her brief, 
which is as follows : 
R-Record 
S/R-Supplen1ental Record 
OT-Original Transcript 
T-Stipulated Transcript 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
MARY GILCHRIST CURRY, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
H. DONALD CURRY, 
Defendant and Appellant, 
and 
SHELL OIL COMPANY, 
D,ef enda;nt. 
Case No. 
8562 
EXPLANATORY COMMENT AND 
PROCEDURAL STATEMENT 
Over a year ago the Respondent in this action filed 
.a c·omplaint, as plaintiff, alleging grounds for and pray-
ing for a divorce from her husband, defendant below 
and App·ellant here. Respondent alleged cruelty as the 
ground for the divorce (R. 1). The Appellant filed an 
Answer and a Counterclaim (R. 9). In his Answer Appel-
lant denied Respondent's allegations of cruelty, but in 
his Counterclaim he alleged that the Respondent h.ad 
treated him cruelly and that if a divorce were granted 
he had grounds therefore and prayed that it be granted 
in his favor (R. 11). The Respondent filed a Reply 
(R. 12). 
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2 
The action was tried to the Court, both parties 
elieiting evidence in support of their allegations of 
cruelty. At the conclusion of the evidence the Appellant 
moved that the court grant him the divorce and custody 
of the children (T. 57). The Court made findings of fact 
and conclusions of law (R. 20-26) and entered its decree 
(R. 27). The Court determined that each party had been 
cruel to the other, but determined that the Appellant 
\vas entitled to the divorce (R. 21, 24). 
The Court awarded custody of the children to the 
RPspondent subject to specified rights of visitation (R. 
27) . The Court made a settlement of property interest~ 
and a\varded alimon·y· and support money (R. 28) pur-
suant to a stipulation thereon by the parties. The Court 
specifically retained continuing jurisdiction regardless 
of Respondent's residence (R. 30). 
The .A--ppellant filed his X otiee of Appeal. The trans-
cript of the eYidenee and proeeedings was prepared but 
tbP Court and the attorneys concerned determined that 
it "·a~ not satisfactorY in that it \Yas so inaccurate 
that it co1npletely failed to reflect the testi1nony of the 
"·itne~~<.)~. It \Yas agreed bet\Yeen the Court and the 
partiP~ that .a stnten1ent of the evidence \vould be pre-
parPd in liPu of the reporter~s transcript of the evidenee 
(~/It 4~ 5). 
ThP attornt"\ys for the parties prepared and agreed 
upon a na rra ti\"e stn te1nent of the evidence and stipulated 
that it hP used on this appeal in .all particulars as the 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
3 
testimony of the witnesses in lieu of the reporter's trans-
cript of the witnesses' testimony previously filed herein. 
(See Stipulation Regarding Transcript, and the state-
ment attached thereto.) 
STATEMENT OF F AC'TS 
Unfortunately the Respondent cannot adopt the Ap-
pellant's Statement of Facts as being correct. Appellant's 
Statement of Facts is highly argumentive, and 1nuch of 
the material contained therein is not supported by the 
record before this court. The Appellant's Statement of 
Facts is misleading in the following particulars : The 
entire paragraph which begins at the bottom of page 2 
of Appellant's Brief and continues well onto page 3 
is without foundation in the Record and further it is 
immaterial and improperly offered. Appellant's assertion 
of fact on the same page that the vasectomy was per-
formed upon "the request" and .approval of his wife 
exceeds the bounds of the record. Appellant's statement 
of fact that during periods of hospitalization Respond-
ent "exhibited marked devotion" is also a gross exagger-
ation as the Stipulated Testimony at the citation given 
by Appellant shows (T. 7, 13). Appellant's assertion of 
fact, at page 5 of Appellant's Brief, that he went up 
to Canada to bring back Re.spondent and their children 
is unsupported by the record before this Court. 
In lieu of Appellant's Statement of Fact, the Re-
spondent offers the Explanatory Comment and Pro-
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cedural Statement in this Brief, supra, which covers 
the procedural aspects of this case, and the following 
concise resume of material facts deemed important to an 
understanding of the i.ssues raised by this appeal: 
Appellant and Respondent were married on Decem-
ber 15, 1945, in Calgary, Alberta, Canada. Appellant 
was a United States citizen; Respondent resided in 
Canada (T. 1). Appellant is a geologist and his work 
has taken him to various parts of the United States, 
Canada and Europe. The couple have resided in Cali-
fornia, Wyoming, and Utah. They have four minor chil-
dren who at the time of the commencement of this action 
in January, 1956, ranged from two and one-half to seven 
years of age. Evidence introduced at the trial to the 
effect that the Plaintiff treated Re_spondent cruelly re-
volved in part around his religious attitude, his philo-
sophy of life, and sexual demands. Evidence was intro-
duced that the Respondent treated Appellant cruelly 
in that she had transferred her affections to another. 
In general eYidence "~as adduced tending to show that 
the difficulties had been of long standing origin, arising 
from the sexual de1nand_s of .... \.ppellant and troubles 
caused thereby "~hieh had plagued their 1narriage long 
prior to the asserted transferral of affections, although 
the AppPllnnt tended to place the turning point at a 
<·Prtnin dnte and to tie it in "'ith the ~Ir. HX" mentioned 
in 1\ ppPllant's Brief. Ho,YeYer~ Appellant n1akes no 
elain1 and there is no evidenee of any infidelity on the 
part of respondent. The p.arties had sineerely but with-
out sneec~~ engaged the aid of a 1narriage counselor. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
5 
Appellant underwent a vasectomy operation in 1953 
to try to remove one cau.se of discord (T. 5). 
The Respondent submits to this Honorable Court 
that the stipulated narrative statement of the evidence 
contains all of the witnesses' testimony before the court 
in this case, that the statement is relatively short and 
that in place of a further extended discu.ssion of the 
facts that the c·ourt be requested to refer to the stipu-
lated statement, if it desires further expansion of the 
evidence. However, the Respondent submits that this 
ease can be sum1narily disposed of on a question of lavv 
and that further resort to the facts may well be un-
necess.ary. 
STATE~iENT OF POINTS 
POINT I. 
THE APPELLANT IS WITHOUT STANDING TO AT-
TA·CK 'THE DECREE OF DIVORCE BECAUSE HE 
COUNTERCLAIMED ALLEGING GROUNDS THEREFORE, 
ELICITED EVIDENCE IN SUPPORT THEREOF, AND AT 
THE CLOSE OF THE TRIAL MOVED THE COURT TO 
GRANT HIM THE DIVORCE. 
POINT II. 
EVEN IF THE COURT SHOULD ACCEPT APPE~ 
LANT'S POINT I, THE EVIDENCE SUPPORTS THE FIND-
ING THAT A DIVORCE SHOULD BE GRANTED, AND IF 
THE COURT SEES FIT TO SET ASIDE THE DECREE 
AWARDED TO APPELLANT AT HIS REQUEST IT IS 
PROPER TO GRANT A DIVORCE IN RESPONDENT'S 
FAVOR. 
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POIN'T III. 
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN GRANTING THE CUST-
ODY OF THE MINOR CHILDREN TO THE RESPONDENT. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE APPELLANT IS WITHOUT STANDING TO AT-
TACK THE DECREE OF DIVORCE BECAUSE HE 
COUNTERCLAIMED ALLEGING GROUNDS THEREFORE 
' ELICITED EVIDENCE IN SUPPORT THEREOF, AND AT 
THE CLOSE OF THE TRIAL MOVED THE COURT TO 
GRANT HIM THE DIVORCE. 
Difficult as it is to determine the ..._~ppellant's ra-
tionale~ it seems that his argument is that the evidence 
does not support the court's findings in his favor which 
he requested in his pleadings, b~~ testimony elicited by 
his counsel, ,,~hich he in·n.ted by his theor~~ of the case 
at trial and by his reliance upon his counterclaim, and 
he further argues that there is insufficient endence 
to support the a'rard 1nade at Iris instance in his favor, 
and that there is not enough evidence to support a 
diy·orce for R.espondent and thus the decree should be 
Y.a en t Pd. I Ie thn8 asks this Court to allow hiln to do 
a ron1pleh• .. about-face .. on appeal. 
In his conntt•rclainl the ... A.ppellnnt alleged as ground8 
for n d i yo reP that 11 is "·ife had treated hiin eruelly .. A.t 
the trial h<\ brought forth br questions asked by his 
o\vn coHHsPl tht• tt\stinionr needed to support his alle-
g-ation (T . ..t-, 5). The questioning of Respondent by 
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Appellant'.s counsel with reference to :11:r. Alex ~1c­
Doug.ald was for this purpose-it could have had no 
other purpose (T. 4). It is a bit late now for the Ap·pel-
lant to say that he did not desire the relief he prayed 
for and which was granted him. 
The Appellant has introduced by way of his brief 
matters not properly in the record 'vhich the Respondent 
believes to be i1nproper and immaterial. However, since 
the Appellant has done this, Respondent feels constrained 
to mention that at the tin1e that the Court 'vas 
discussing the disposition of the case subsequent to the 
hearing of the evidence (mentioned by Ap·pellant at 
page 3 of his Brief) and at which time Appellant notes 
a discussion with reference to Wilson vs. Wilson, 5 Utah 
2d 79, 296 P. 2d 977, that the Court specifically asked 
the Appellant if he vvished to withdraw his Counter-
claim. Counsel for the Appellant answered that he did 
not wish to vvithdra'v the Counterclain1. The record be-
fore this court shows that the Counterclaim alleging 
grounds for divorce in favor of Appellant and praying 
for a divorce in his favor if .a divorce 'vere granted 
furnished the foundation for Appellant's theory of his 
case belovv. It is significant to note in this regard that 
after counsel's summation and upon hearing that the 
Court felt that a divorce was merited that Counsel for 
Appellant moved the Court for a divorce in his favor 
and for custody of the children. This motion will be 
found at page 57 of the original transcript and is part 
of the record before this court for the reason that the 
stipulated narrative statement of testimony covers, af'-
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cording to the stipulation of counsel, only the testimony 
of witnesses. Thus, with or without the matter not 
properly in the record, it is manifest that the Appellant 
is now asking this Court to undo what he intentionally 
did up. 
It is a rule of long standing and of obvious merit 
that a party cannot successfully complain of acts or 
of error which he induced the court to commit or for 
rulings \vhich he invited the trial court to make. 
3 Am. Jur. Sec. 876. 
This rule of estoppel applies equally to pleadings, 
evidence, instructions, findings, judgments, and rulings 
on motions. 
3 .A.1n. Jur. Sec. 878, 879, S80, 882. 
In Esse:r Packers rs. Kisecker. 373 Pa. 351, 95 A. 2d 
5-t-t the court held that one ,,~ho had been granted a 
new· trial upon his OW"Il motion would not be heard to 
ron1plain that it "~as granted. 
Thi~ eourt has held that "~here a person brought 
up an i ~sue he ""ould not be heard to eo1nplain that the 
court decided it. 
Brou·n rs. Skeen. ~D lTtah 5GS~ 5S P. 2d 2±. 
On the 1nntter of self-inYited error this eourt has 
ru]Pd~ n~ is the unanilnous rule, that one will not be 
lu).nrd to con1plain of instructions given at his request. 
1\Tcl.\oo'On l'S. Lott, 81 lTtah 265, 17 P. 2d 272. 
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Pett-ingill vs. Perkins, 2 Utah 2d 266, 272 P. 2d 185. 
Authorities supporting the proposition that one can-
not change his theory of the case on appeal, complain 
that he got that which he asked for, or in any material 
manner take advantage of "self-invited error" are legion. 
The necessity for this rule is obvious. 
The appellant need not have alleged that grounds 
existed in his favor, he need not have minutely examined 
\vitnesses with reference to these specific grounds, he 
need not have moved for a decree in his favor, he need 
not have refused to withdraw his counterclaim when 
given the opportunity by the trial court-but he did. 
The .appellant could have asked for an amendment of 
the court's findings, could have asked the court which 
heard the case to grant him relief-he did not. Instead 
he has waited until filing his brief on appeal, nearly 
two years after the trial, to say "my pleadings were 
in error, my elicited testimony is insufficient, my theory 
of the c.ase was wrong, I now desire to change my mind." 
To allow this would absolutely nulify the rules of law 
calculated to maintain the sanctity and stability of judi-
cial determination. That such is not to be done is ele-
mentary hornbook law. This court properly said in 
Pettingill vs. Perkins, 2 Ut.ah 2d 266, 272 P. 2d 185 (1954) 
that where a case is tried on one theory (and that theory 
prevails) that that theory is the law of the case and that 
the proponent of that theory will not be allowed to shift 
his position and theory on appeal. 
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Even assuming the a_ssertions of the Appellant cor-
rect with referrence to his reasons, i.e. that there is 
insufficient evidence to support the findings in his favor, 
he would not be heard to complain for even in cases 
of actual error, he who induced such error cannot there-
after assert such error on appeal. This court said in 
N~elson vs. Lott, 81 Utah 265, 17 P. 2d 272 (1932): 
"Appellant complains of instruction No. 14, 
for the reason that the same assumes that the 
last chance doctrine is applicable. \\~e are inclined 
to agree "~i th counsel, but as the instruction is 
identical w·ith defendant's request X o. 5, with the 
exception of the words "exercising due care and 
caution," appellant has no cause for complaint. 
Re~!)Ondent respectfully submits that the Court did 
not err in the 1nanner suggested by ..._\_ppellant, and, a 
fortiori~ there is IilOre co1npelling reason for not per-
Initting the .. A.ppellant to "~ithdra"~ his pleadings, nor to 
drnoulH.'P the eYidence he elicited in snr)port of his plead-
in 1 .. :--; nor to attack the finding-s of fact and conclusion8 
,-...... ~ 1.._ 
nf la\\· Pntered thereon, nor to change his n1ind and 
"·ithdra\\· hi~~ 1notion n1ade at the close of the trial that 
n diYol'<'(\ he gT<1nted in his fa.YOI\ and .at this stage of 
t h0 ntattPr, nea rl~· t\\ .. 0 yea r8 subsequent to the inception 
ol' thi~ aetion and nt"\arly eighteen 1nonths subsequent 
1 o tltP granting of the interlocutor~· decree in his favor 
and on hi~ n1otinn and "·ithout haYing in any 1nanner 
nt tPntpt Pd to u~e~ let .alone exhaust~ his re1nedies before 
t 1H\ t rinl eonrt, to InnkP the proposal that the trial court 
prrPd hPeaU~<' it found in his favor and a.t his specific 
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request and in accord with a theory of the case presented 
by hin1 and followed by him at the trial. 
Innumerable .authorities from all jurisdictions, with-
out exception, support the rule here relied upon by Re-
.spondent. There is no foundation in either law, logic 
or experience to support the request the Appellant makes 
in his Point I. Cases concerning this type of issue occupy 
page after page in the American Digest System, digested 
under Appeal and Error, key numbers 882 (and its 
numerous subdivisions) and 883. 
A few of the cases representing the law 1n this 
matter are: 
In re Cla~tssenius' Estate, 96 c·.A. 2d 600, 216 P. 
2d 485. 
Staley vs. Fazel Bros., 247 Iow.a 644, 75 N.W. 2d 
253 (Appellant could not complain of testi-
mony elicited by his own cros.s-examination). 
Schlecht vs. Schiel, 76 Ariz. 214, 262 P. 2d 252. 
Smith vs. City and County of San Francisco, 117 
C.A. 2d 749, 256 P. 2d 999. 
POINT II. 
EVEN IF THE COURT SHOULD ACCEPT APPEL-
LANT'S POINT I, THE EVIDEN·CE SUPPORTS THE FIND-
ING THAT A DIVORCE SHOULD BE GRANTED, AND IF 
THE COURT SEES FIT TO SET ASIDE THE DECREE 
AWARDED TO APPELLANT AT HIS REQUEST IT IS 
PROPER TO GRANT A DIVORCE IN RESPONDENT'S 
FAVOR. 
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Appellant takes the position that the evidence eli-
cited fails to support the decree awarded him, stating 
that it was incumbent upon him to show a more aggra-
vated case than were he the wife, and that he did not, 
and further that there is not sufficient evidence to sup-
port a decree in favor of Respondent. 
Although it may appear somewhat inconsistent for 
the Re.spondent to attempt to support the decree of 
divorce granted Appellant, it is submitted by the Re-
spondent that the more recent cases from this court 
modify the earlier Utah cases cited by Appellant, and 
that where it is apparent that the marriage is not sal-
vageable that a divorce should be granted. It is clear 
from the evidence that this marriage is now beyond 
hope of reclammation. The enlightened policy of the 
law in this respect i.s well founded on Utah decisions. 
Wilson vs. Wilson, 5 Utah 2d 79, 296 P. 2d 977. 
Hendricks vs. Hendricks, ______ lTtah ______ , 257 P. 2d 
366. 
The case of Hyrup vs. Hyru.p, 66 lTtah 580, 245 P. 
335, cited as authority for the proposition that a divorce 
is not merited in the instant eontroversy, by the Appel-
lant, is clearly not applicable. Th'is court pointed out in 
Johnson vs. Johnson, 107 Utah 1-±7, 15~ P. 2d 426 at 
427, that the evidence in the H yru p case revealed t,,~o 
quarrels ove-r a period of several years. This is clearly 
not the same as the instant case wherein the record 
properly before this Court shows a long histor~T of fric-
tion, cruel treatment, excessive sexual den1ands, incon-
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sider.ation, and other deterioration of the marriage over 
an extended period of time which even the sincere at-
tempts of the parties and their marriage counselor were 
unable to sur1nount. The trial court was correet in his 
finding that grounds for divorce existed, and he was 
correct in h'is conclusion of law that the marriage should 
be terminated. 
Two years have nearly elapsed since the institution 
of these proceedings. During this time the parties have 
lived apart. The evidence before the trial court con-
vinced him that their marriage was destroyed and that 
to force them to continue living as husband and wife 
would be intolerable. He thus awarded the decree to 
the p.arty who in his opinion was least at fault. 
Although Wilson vs. Wilson, 5 Utah 2d 79, 296 P. 2d 
977 concerns itself with a pToperty distribution incident 
to a divorce, the Court restated the correct rule of law 
which is applicable to the instant case. The Court said 
that when the purposes of matrimony had been destroyed 
to the extent that further living together was intolerable 
it was the court's duty .and prerogative to grant a divorce. 
Hendricks vs. Hendricks, ____________ Utah ____________ , 257 
P. 2d 366, is directly in point. The opinion in that case, 
though short, is to the point and lucidly expresses the 
law to be applied where both parties are at fault. Al-
though there may be some instances where the court 
of equity might be justified in refusing relief if both 
parties are found at fault, it is explained that such a 
doctrine ha.s no place where the charges are cruelty. 
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Our statute does not limit the granting of a divorce to 
a party not at fault. No good purpose could conceivably 
be served by refusing to terminate the marriage which 
has in fact been terminated by the Appellant's own 
request by an interlocutory decree of divorce for a period 
approaching two years. 
It is assumed that the citation by Appellant at 
page 7 of his brief to White vs. White, 281 P. 2d 745, 
as .a Utah case and implying that it is declaratory of 
Utah law is an inadvertant error. White vs. White i~ 
an Oklahoma case specifically concerned with an Okla-
homa statutory provision not found in our statutory 
law, .a pTovision in Oklahoma which allows the court, 
in its discretion, to refuse to grant a divorce where 
the parties appear to be in equal \vrong. This is not 
the law of Utah. 
Hendricks vs. Hendricks, ____________ Utah ____________ , 257 
P. 2d 366. 
Steiger vs. Steiger, 4 Utah 2d 273, 293 P. 2d 418. 
·However, if the Court feels that it should grant 
the Appellant'.s request to be relieYed of the decree he 
requested, it is but proper to .a''Tard a decree of divorce 
to the Respondent. The evidence supports it, the find-
ings of the trial eourt support it. Equity and fair play 
would de1nand it. 
POINT III. 
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN GRANTING THE CUST-
ODY OF THE MINOR CHILDREN TO THE RESPONDENT. 
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The Appellant's second point is as poorly taken 
as is his first. Again he resorts to statements not found 
in the record by referring to Appellant's having gone 
to Canada to bring the Respondent and the child back 
to Utah in July of 1954 (Appellant's Brief, page 10). 
The Respondent submits that there is no mention of such 
a trip by the Appellant in the stipulated statement of 
testimony. The statement on page 11 of Appellant'.s Brief 
concerning the vasectomy is again not supported by 
the record before this court. Appellant's statement of 
fact that his work keeps him in Salt Lake City is .also 
without foundation. The fact is that his employment has 
caused him to travel considerably. 
Appellant refers to Respondent's expressions of 
intent to return to Canada as being the real nub of the 
reason why Appellant should be granted custody of the 
children. In reply it must be noted that there is no 
showing that the Respondent is not a proper person 
to have custody of the children. The trial court spe-cific-
ally found the Respondent to be a fit and proper person 
to have custody of the children, and the Appellant has 
not seen fit to attack this finding (R. 21). Appellant's 
fears, even if they were to be well grounded are insuffi-
cient grounds for this court to act upon, for the lower 
court retained continuing jurisdiction in this matter and 
his remedy would be available there if one is to be 
given him. 
The Respondent is subject to the continuing jurisdic-
tion of the trial court, regardless of her place of resi-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
16 
dence (R. 30). Since the trial court has retained contin-
uing juri.sdiction in this respect, it is there that the Ap-
pellant must first seek relief, if he merits it. 
The Appellant insists that the trial court erred in 
granting custody primarily to the Respondent. In this 
assertion the Appellant 'is not _supported by the facts nor 
by the applicable law. The welfare of the children is 
the p·rimary, paramount and controlling consideration in 
determining the question of custody of minor children. 
Although they will be considered, of course, by the court 
in arriving at its decision, the wishes and personal de-
sires of the p.arents must yield to the welfare of the chil-
dren. 
2 Nelson on Divorce 167. 
Smith vs. Smith, 1 Utah 2d 75, 262 P. 2d 383. 
Sampsell vs. Holt, 115 Utah 73, 202 P. 2d 550. 
In the recent case of Steiger vs. Steiger, 4 Utah 2d 
273, 293 P. 2d 418, this court again stated the under-
lying principles applicable to a situation such as the 
instant one. This Court affirmed the granting of a di-
vorce to the counterclain1ing husb.and but a'varded the 
custody of the child to the n1other subject to subsequent 
review, the Court stating that the para1nount considera-
tion was the welfare of the child. 
The Appellant does not assert, nor can he, that the 
Respondent is unfit to have the children. Though he 
makes lukewarm suggestions that in his opinion the 
children might be better off 'vith hin1, it is clear that his 
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request for custody is prim.arily motivated by an under-
standable, but not legally controlling nor material per-
sonal desire vvhich doe.s not have as its p-rimary basis 
a consideration of the welfare of his children, but of 
his own personal preference. 
It is of some interest to note that at pages 10 and 
11 of his brief the Appellant expre.ssly declares the very 
facts which he denies having sufficiently proved under 
his Point I. 
Again it may be noted that the trial court did not 
find the Appellant completely faultless in this affair (R. 
21). 
In concluding argument on this point, Respondent 
desires to point out that the Appellant contends that he 
is virtually required to stay in Salt Lake City for econ-
omic re.asons. This i.s untrue for he is an experienced 
trained geologist admittedly capable of earning $10,000 
per year. Appellant asse-rts that at all stages of the pro-
ceedings he has opposed the divorce. His filing of a 
Counterclaim, eliciting of evidence in support thereof, 
his motion for a divorce in his favor, his failure to 
complain, vvhen he had the opportunity to so do, to the 
trial court, his refusal to withdraw his Counterclaim 
when offered the chance, his long delay in asserting 
this argument for the first time on ap·peal certainly 
contradicts his assertion that he has at all stages op-
posed the divorce. 
Thi.s marriage has been completely seve-red for only 
slightly less than two years at this time. The Appellant 
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speaks of equitable treatment. The Respondent respect-
fully submits that granting the prayer requested by Ap-
pellant would not only be manifestly contrary to the law, 
but would also be of a grossly inequitable nature f.ar 
exceeding any "inequity" asserted by Appellant. The 
decree of the trial court was most fair in allowing the 
App·ellant rights of visitation and of temporary custody 
of the children. The law and the decree both allow his 
petition for a change, if and when there are conditions 
to merit it. The dissolution of his marriage is indeed 
to be lamented, particularly where small children are 
involved, but to continue the marriage, or to award 
custody to the Appellant would be to re-infect and ag-
gravate and not to cure and alleviate. 
CONCLUSION 
On the basis of the record before this Court and 
the law applicable thereto, the Respondent respectfully 
prays that this Honorable Court deny the requests n1ade 
by the Appellant, and that this court affirm the decree 
of the lower court, or failing so to do th.at the divorce 
decree be modified only to the extent of granting the 
divorce to the Respondent. 
Respectfully sub1nitted, 
LEE W. HOBBS, 
Attorney for Plaintiff and 
Respondent, Mary Gilchrist 
· Curry 
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